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SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS-ASSIGNMENT BY CESTUI QUE TRUST.
As an illustration of how firmly the doctrine of spend-
thrift trusts is established in the law of Pennsylvania, the Su-
preme Court recently decided that where a testatrix gave a
share of her estate to her executor to pay the income to her
son, "but no part of the principal of said estate is to be given
to my said son for five years after my death, and then only
when in the judgment of my executors 'he shall prove himself'
to be entirely competent and qualified to take proper care of
the same," the son cannot assign or sell such share within
five years from the death of the testatrix, and if he attempts to
do so, his assignee or vendee takes no valid title.'
The appellant, assignee of the legatee, filed a petition ask-
Siegwarth's Estate, 226 Pa. 591.
(498)
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ing for an accounting by the trustee of the cestii que trust,
treating his share of the estate as absolute; but it was held,
that irrespective of the character of the estate in the legatee,
there is seated upon it an active trust at least for a period of
five years, and maybe longer, and inasmuch as the five-year
period had not yet expired, he has not come into possession of
his share which is still held by the executors in trust for the
uses and purposes stated in the will; and that it is not neces-
sary to consider or determine the kind or character of the
estate given to the legatee, because the time has not yet arrived
either for himself or for his assignee to demand that the
estate be turned over to the persbn or persons ultimately en-
titled to the use and enjoyment of it. The hands of all parties
are tied during that period.
This was clearly an attempt by the testatrix to vest the
fee in the legatee, but to hold it in abeyance for a period of
five years or longer at the discretion of the executors; the in-
come to be paid to him in the meantime; for the word "estate"
when used by a testator, and not restrained to a narrower sig-
nification by the context of the will, is sufficient to carry the fee.
An examination of the authorities in jurisdictions where
spendthrift trusts are allowed indicates that the doctrine is
strictly limited to equitable life estates; for alienability and
liability for the donee's debts are two necessary incidents of a
fee simple estate ;2 a provision not to aliene being repugnant to
the estate granted. It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that
it is important to consider the kind and character of the estate
given to the legatee, in determining whether the restraint
sought to be imposed is valid or not.
The validity of a limitation over of a life interest is not
questioned either in England or America; but where an estate
was devised "unto and to the use of" a daughter, her heirs and
assigns, subject to the provision that in case she should at any
time be declared a bankrupt. the devise should be void, and
the premises should go, remain and be unto and to the use of
her children, it was held that the daughter took a fee simple
estate, and as a condition pure and simple is repugnant to such
an estate, the provision in the will was void ;3 but Chitty, J.,
said that had the provision been, "I give to my daughter the
property for her life, and if she become bankrupt, over to
somebody else, and if she does not become bankrupt, then to
her in fee," it would be subject to a different construction.
The conditional limitation would have been good.
25o Albany Law Journal, p. 5.
'In re Machn, L. R. 21, Ch. Div. 838.
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If the trust is to pay the income to the beneficiary, al-
though for his support, his creditors, if not expressly excluded,
can reach all that the beneficiary is entitled to even in jurisdic-
tions where these trusts are allowed." Thus where the testa-
tor by his will gave to his wife during her life the income of
all the estate "to be for her comfort and support," expressing
a wish that she provide for an unmarried daughter, and that a
"house and grounds be kept as a home" for them, it was held
that after the daughter's death the wife had the absolute dis-
posal of the income during her life, and that it might be
reached by her creditors.5 The test is, would the executors
of the cestui que trust have a right to call for any arrears? If
so, the interest is vested, and the assignee would have the right
to call for the future income or interest.0 Applying this test
to the facts in Siegwarth's Estate, it would seem to follow
that even under the doctrine of spendthrift trusts, the income
might be assigned during the five-year period; but the Court
does not expressly decide this point. The doctrine of spend-
thrift trusts is absolutely repudiated in England and in many
American jurisdictions; and being of extremely doubtful public
policy, and admittedly inconsistent with the rules of common
law, any extension of the doctrine must be viewed with ap-
prehension unless clearly justified by changing social condi-
tions. G.H. B.
WHEN MAY CORPORATIONS REFUSE TO REGISTER ON THEIR
Booxs TRANSFERS OF STOCK?
In the case of O'Neil v. Wolcott Mining Co.,' W, the owner
of 3,000 shares of stock, endorsed the certificate in blank,
with a power of attorney, and placed it in the hands of his
agent D. D represented to C that he was owner of the shares,
showing the certificate and power of attorney, and represented
further that the stock would be transferred upon the books of
the corporation on request. Relying upon these representa-
tions, C bought the shares, on condition that the corporation
would transfer title on their books. The corporation refused
to transfer title on their books. Their defense was: (I) that
thirteen years before the above transaction, W had advised
them that he had lost some stock certificates, and had requested
'Ames on Trusts, 2nd Ed., 405 Note.
*Maynard v. Cleaves, 149 Mass. 357.
*Perry on Trusts, § 386.
. 174 Fed. 527.
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them not to transfer any of his stock; (2) that D, subsequent
to the corporation's temporary refusal, notified them that the
stock was to be retained by W.
The Court held (I) the notice given thirteen years previously
was not a sufficient cause for refusal; (2) the subsequent
notice was not sufficient cause, because W did not, within a
reasonable time, commence any action to asert his title. The
opinion was, in part, as follows: "A blank assignment and
power of attorney to transfer stock endorsed upon the cer-
tificate thereof estop the transferror from claiming any fur-
ther title to . . the stock, as against subsequent bona
fide transferees thereof, although the transfer is not recorded
on the books of the corporation. . . Vhere the rights of
a claimant are reasonably clear, and the corporation suspends
action and gives to another an opportunity to establish his op-"
posing claim, and he neither does so before the corporation,
nor commences any action to prevent the transfer within a
reasonable time, it is the duty of the corporation to record
the transfer demanded by the first claimant. . . . Evi-
dence of some adverse title, interest, or lien, that at least
raises a substantial doubt of the right of a demandant to a
transfer of stock, is indispensable to a refusal to make it. The
corporation, when it refuses, and upon trial of the issue, the
Court, must be able to see from the facts established that there
is some question to be tried. A mere claim of stock is not
sufficient." The Court decreed for the plaintiff. The case is
not a close one, on its facts, particularly as the defendants
failed to call certain witnesses, whose testimony, according to
the pleadings, would have been material.
The case suggests the question: When may corporations
refuse to register on their books, transfers of title to their
stock? This question is not necessarily affected by any pre-
liminary inquiry as to whether title to the stock passes by de-
livery of the endorsed certificate or by transfer on the books of
the corporation. That inquiry is beyond the scope of this note.
2
A case very similar to, and in accord with the principal case,
is Skinner v. Ft. Wayne, etc., RyY In that case R delivered
to S, his creditor, certificates of stock, with a power of at-
'On this question there is a conflict of authority. It is interesting
to note that the late Professor Langdell, who upheld the entity theory,
and Professor Pepper, who upholds the group theory, both contend
that, on principle, transfer on the books is necessary to vest legal title
in the transferee. C. C. Langdell, in it Harvard L. Rev. 537, 538; G.
W. Pepper, in 52 American L. Reg. 745, 747.
a 58 Fed. 55.
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torney to transfer title, together with the assignment of a
construction contract. The several instruments, construed to-
gether, showed an intention to invest S with the legal title. R
afterwards requested the corporation not to transfer title.
The Court held: "So long as the validity of these instru-
ments (the power of attorney and the assignment) remains
unchallenged, the defendant has no discretion in respect to
the transfer of the stock, and has no concern with equities,
if any, between S and R."
When a transfer of stock is presented to a corporation for
registry, if it be in doubt as to the identity of the person
presenting it, whether he be the registered stockholder, or his
agent, the corporation may require proof of such identity.4
The officers have a reasonable time, after a transfer has been
requested, in which to find out whether they should make
it or not.5
It has been held that the officers of a corporation have no
right to withhold their assent to a transfer because, in their
judgment, the motives and purposes of the parties are im-
proper, or because the transfer may affect injuriously the in-
terests of the company itself.0 On the other hand it has been
held that equity will not compel a corporation to register a
transfer of stock to a complainant who has not bought for
value, and who seeks to obtain control of the corporation in
order to wreck it.7 Quaere, if complainant admit he seeks to
wreck the defendant, but is a 'purchaser for value? 8 There
seems to be no decision which squarely meets this question.
Gould v. Head does not answer it, because it was not shown
that complainant had paid value. It is submitted that regis-
try should be regarded as an incident of the ownership (legal
or equitable) acquired by purchase and receipt of the certifi-
cate. It would therefore seem that in such a case, defendant
would have to register the transfer, in the absence of a statu-
tory discretion in the directors to refuse same. There is a
dictum to that effect in Rice v. Rockefeller.9 This case does not
however squarely meet the question, as complainant testified
that he wished to become a stockholder in good faith, and the
trial court accepted his testimony at face value.
'Telegraph Co. v. Davenport, 97 U. S. 369 (1878).
'Dunham v. City Trust Co., II5 N. Y. App. Div. 584 (igo6).
* Townsend v. Mclver, 2 S. C. (N. S.) 25 (187o).
'Gould v. Head, 41 Fed. 240, 248 (189o).
" This case is inaccurately quoted in 2 Cook, Corporations (6th Ed.),
p. Io95, n. 3.
o 134 N. Y. 174.
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Generally, the corporation can refuse a registry only when
there is doubt as to the legal title of the applicant to have
such registry. It follows as a necessary corollary that it may
not refuse to transfer stock, on the ground that the vendor
had agreed with others not to transfer the stock.10
In England, the directors are by charter often given a dis-
cretionary power to refuse such transfer. The directors must,
however, exercise such discretion in good faith."
The law of certificates of stock is by no means settled. It
frequently happens that there are two claimants, one claiming
by delivery of the certificate, the other by levy and execution
on the transferror's interest. In such cases it is not easy for
the corporation to decide who is entitled to the stock. It
need not decide between such conflicting rights. Where there
is a reasonable doubt as to the facts involved, or as to the re-
spective rights of the claimants, and the corporation is sued
by one of the claimants for refusing to allow a registry by
him, the corporation may interplead and thus compel the claim-
ants to ascertain their rights in a court of justice.12 There is
some doubt as to when a corporation may safely claim a right
to refuse to act and to compel the claimants to litigate between
themselves before it allows a registry to either. Where the
rights of one claimant are reasonably clear, as in the principal
case, the corporation should suspend action for a reasonable
time, within which time the protesting party may bring suit,
and if no such action is brought, it should allow a registry
by the first claimant.13 Where the corporation has allowed
one claimant to register his transfer, or has recognized him
as a stockholder, the right of the corporation to interplead is
gone.
14
It is worth noting that under the proposed uniform Cer-
tificate of Stock Act, certificates of stock will be fully negoti-
able."5 Under this act, the corporation would be legally obliged
to transfer title on their books to any one who had obtained
the certificate bona fide, and for value, even though he derived
title from a thief or a finder. This is a long step in advance.
No statute or decision in England or America goes this far.
On the whole, the existing law on this subject seems to con-
form to the practical requirements of business convenience.
'°Sylvaida R. R. v. Hoge, 59 S. E. Rep. 8o6 (Ga. 19o7).
Re Letheby, 19o4, i Ch. Div. 815; Re Bell, 65 L. T. Rep. 245.
'Leavitt v. Fisher, 4 Duer (N. Y. 1854), I.
"Townsend v. Mclver, supra.
"Mt. Holly Co. v. Ferrie, 17 N. J. Eq. 117.
25§ 3.
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That the courts and the legislatures should be guided by such
considerations, seems in the main, highly desirable. But it is
submitted that there are also strong reasons against following
mercantile custom, when such custom is too far ahead of, and
contrary to, established principles of law. It is submitted
that the policy of making stock certificates fully negotiable, in
the uniform act, is open to question. The object of the act
is to make the law uniform. Would it not be easier to have the
act adopted if it sought to codify law as existing in the major-
ity of jurisdictions, and left reforms in the law for some future
and more propitious time? The experience of the English
codifiers with the Partnership Act of i89o and the Limited
Partnership Act of 1907 seems to afford an affirmative answer
to this question.16  E.A.L.
"The Partnership Act of i89o originally included sections providing
for Limited Partnerships-a reform in the law of England. It was
only after these sections were stricken out, that the rest of the act was
passed. The Limited Partnership Act was finally passed seventeen years
later. See F. M. Burdick, in Io Col. L. Rev. 118; Pollock, Essay on
Partnership; F. M. Burdick, in 6 Mich. L. Rev. 525.
